The Accountability of the European Stability Mechanism and the European Monetary Fund

• Autores: Francesco Pennesi
• Localización: European papers: a journal on law and integration, ISSN-e 2499-8249, Vol. 3, Nº. 2, 2018, págs. 511-545
• Idioma: inglés
• Títulos paralelos:
  • Who Should Answer for Conditionality Measures?
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• Resumen

  • This Article analyses the judicial and political accountability of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in light of the seminal Mallis and Ledra cases (respectively, Court of Justice: judgment of 20 September 2016, case C-105/15 P, Mallis and Malli v Commission and ECB [GC]; judgment of 20 September 2016, case C-8/15 P, Ledra Advertising v. Commission and ECB [GC]). It seeks to determine to what extent the intergovernmental nature of the ESM has shielded its activity from the accountability mechanisms established within EU law. It then assesses whether the Proposal, recently issued by the Commission, to transform the ESM into an EU body, the European Monetary Fund (EMF), would improve the accountability of this body. It is argued that embedding conditionality policies in the European constitutional legal order constitutes a necessary, but not a sufficient step. To achieve this objective, it is necessary to couple a close judicial scrutiny by the Court of Justice with an equally substantial democratic oversight by the European Parliament.