Case selection and judicial decision-making: evidence from French labor courts.

• Desrieux, Claudine ^[1] ; Espinosa, Romain ^[2]
  1. [1] Panthéon-Assas University

     Panthéon-Assas University

     París, Francia

     
  2. [2] CNRS, CREM - Université Rennes 1 Rennes France
• Localización: European journal of law and economics, ISSN 0929-1261, Vol. 47, Nº 1, 2019, pág. 57
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • Using a database on French labor courts between 1998 and 2012, we investigate case selection and judicial decision-making. In France, judges are elected at the labor court level on lists proposed by unions, and litigants can first try to settle their case before the judicial hearing. We show that the ideological composition of the court indirectly impacts the settlement behavior of the parties but has no influence on the decision made in court. In addition, parties have self-fulfilling behavior and adapt to institutional rules. When they anticipate long judicial procedures at court, they settle more frequently and only require judicial hearings for complex cases. The duration to decide these complex cases is longer, explaining why they observe (and build their anticipation on) long case duration. Our empirical strategy uses probit, ordered probit and triprobit estimations to control for case selection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]