On symmetric stochastic games of resource extraction with weakly continuous transitions

• Anna Jaskiewicz ^[2] ; Andrzej S. Nowak ^[1]
  1. [1] University of Zielona Góra

     University of Zielona Góra

     Zielona Góra, Polonia

     
  2. [2] Wrocław University of Science and Technology, Polonia
• Localización: Top, ISSN-e 1863-8279, ISSN 1134-5764, Vol. 26, Nº. 2, 2018, págs. 239-256
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • We study stochastic games of resource extraction, in which the players have identical preferences. The transition probability is either non-atomic or a convex combination of transition probabilities depending on the investment with coefficients also dependent on the investment. Our approach covers the unbounded utility case, which was not examined in this class of games beforehand. We prove the existence of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium in a non-randomised class of strategies.