On the notion of perfect Bayesian equilibrium

• Julio González-Díaz ^[1] ; Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez ^[2]
  1. [1] Universidade de Santiago de Compostela

     Universidade de Santiago de Compostela

     Santiago de Compostela, España

     
  2. [2] Universidad de Málaga

     Universidad de Málaga

     Málaga, España

     
• Localización: Top, ISSN-e 1863-8279, ISSN 1134-5764, Vol. 22, Nº. 1, 2014, págs. 128-143
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen

  • Often, perfect Bayesian equilibrium is loosely defined by stating that players should be sequentially rational given some beliefs in which Bayes rule is applied “whenever possible.” We argue that there are situations in which it is not clear what “whenever possible” means. Then we provide an elementary definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium for general extensive games that refines both weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium.