Up methods in the allocation of indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked

• Carmen Herrero ^[1] ; Ricardo Martínez ^[2]
  1. [1] Universitat d'Alacant

     Universitat d'Alacant

     Alicante, España

     
  2. [2] Brown University

     Brown University

     City of Providence, Estados Unidos

     
• Localización: Top, ISSN-e 1863-8279, ISSN 1134-5764, Vol. 16, Nº. 2, 2008, págs. 272-283
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • We consider allocation problems with indivisible goods when agents’ preferences are single-peaked. We propose natural rules (called up methods) to solve such a class of problems and axiomatically characterize them. We also prove that these methods can be interpreted as extensions to the indivisible case of the so-called equal distance rule.