Disentangling legislative duration in coalitional presidential systems

• Taeko Hiroi ^[1] ; Lucio Rennó ^[2]
  1. [1] University of Texas at El Paso

     University of Texas at El Paso

     Estados Unidos

     
  2. [2] Universidade de Brasília

     Universidade de Brasília

     Brasil

     
• Localización: The Journal of legislative studies, ISSN 1357-2334, Vol. 24, Nº. 4, 2018, págs. 475-498
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • The speed and actions that bills face in legislatures vary immensely, but we do not have a comprehensive framework to analyse legislative durations. Moreover, the absence of data detailing legislative activities and durations in distinct stages of legislative processes hinders analysis. This article presents a framework for analysing legislative delay in coalitional presidential systems and examines unique data on durations, attributes, and parliamentary activities in legislative processes at the level of individual proposals. The empirical analysis investigates executive proposals considered by the Brazilian Congress and seeks to disentangle when duration means legislative activism, when it is due to political conflict, and when it only represents inertia. Our analysis indicates substantial activities in both content-influencing legislative activism and politically motivated obstructionism. Hence, political conflict is as important a source as policy disagreement in accounting for legislative delay. By examining a hitherto untapped area with rich data, this study opens up new venues for rigorous analyses of legislative durations and gridlock.