This contribution provides an insight into early modern criminal law in Catalonia. The author studies the deep-seated conviction of the judge in the works of Catalan jurists from the sixteeenth to the eighteenth centuries. He observes a refusal to forget a crime when the judge refused to acquit someone whom he believed bu could not fully prove to be guilty. The system of legal proof required confession of the defendant or two witnesses with the same deposition. However, the difficulty of obtaining one or the other and the wish that no crime remain unpunished lead practitioners to envision new solutions. The Catalan jurists refused that an established crime be forgotten an a criminal not be convicted despite the existence of many elements of proof, just because they did not conform to the ius commune. So these jurists drew up a new system combining elements of Roman law, learned opinions and the current system. By this, no elements of proof were forgotten. Firstly, a crime persisted when the judge refused to acquit the defendant. Then, by the "élargissement" and by the "réserve de preuves", the basis of the judge's conviction did not disappear. Finally, this school of thought admitted a lesser penalty based on some evidence, simple presumptions or incomplete proof, "beyond a reasonable doubt".
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