Impossibility theorems with countably many individuals

• Autores: Uuganbaatar Ninjbat
• Localización: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, ISSN 1869-4195, Vol. 9, Nº. 3, 2018, págs. 333-350
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • The problem of social choice is studied on a domain with countably many individuals. In contrast to most of the existing literature which establish either non-constructive possibilities or approximate (i.e. invisible) dictators, we show that if one adds a continuity property to the usual set of axioms, the classical impossibilities persist in countable societies. Along the way, a new proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem in the style of Peter Fishburn’s well known proof of Arrow’s impossibility theorem is obtained.