Can there be alternative-facts? Hannah Arendt’s answer and its political implications
- Autores: Rafael Kasper
- Localización: Aufklärung: revista de filosofia, ISSN-e 2318-9428, Vol. 5, Nº. 2, 2018, págs. 87-96
- Idioma: portugués
- Enlaces
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Resumen
This paper addresses the current discussion on “alternative-facts” and public lying focusing on Hannah Arendt’s take on the relation between truth, reality and politics. It argues that much of what is assumed as novel and unexpected in the ongoing discussion has been anticipated by Arendt in the 1950’s and the 1960’s. Furthermore, it states that her insights and categories provide a deeper understanding of the matter, thus contributing to dismiss common dead-locks in recent debate. Still, there are, in Arendt’s analysis, perplexities – explored and unexplored by her – that deserve our attention in order to grasp the nature of facts and truth. In this line, this paper answers the question put forward in its title – Can there be alternative-facts? - relying on a (Arendt inspired) defense of objective truth, which requires a specific definition of politics and some qualified ontological claims about political reality.
