Decision Costs, Contract Excuse, and the Westinghouse Commercial Impracticability Case

• Autores: Donald Vandegrift
• Localización: European journal of law and economics, ISSN 0929-1261, Vol. 4, Nº 1, 1997, págs. 41-54
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • The literature on performance excuses does not consider the cost of determining whether the conditions established for contract excuse are met. We must incorporate these costs to determine which contract laws are efficient. I show that while the costs of determining whether the conditions for excuse are met will rise with the value of the contested performance, the benefits are unrelated to the value of performance. I conclude that the court should not allow excuse if the value of the contested performance is large.