Supreme auditing institutions: A politico-economic analysis

• Autores: B. S. Frey
• Localización: European journal of law and economics, ISSN 0929-1261, Vol. 1, Nº 3, 1994, págs. 169-176
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • While the beneficial aspects of a public accounting office's activity are not disputed here, it is argued in this article that four major distortions are produced: the concern with administrative rationality overlooks costs elsewhere (Section 2); budgetary aspects are overvalued compared to other issues (Section 3); incentives-oriented behavior is suppressed (Section 4); and the evaluation is biased by concentrating on minor, instead of major, aspects of inefficiency (Section 5). Section 6 considers alternatives to public accounting offices and makes some suggestions for new institutional arrangements particularly for constitutional rules.