Optimal enforcement of competition policy: the commitments procedure under uncertainty

• Autores: Axel Gautier, Nicolas Petit
• Localización: European journal of law and economics, ISSN 0929-1261, Vol. 45, Nº 2, 2018, págs. 195-224
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • The introduction of a commitments procedure in EU antitrust policy (Article 9 of Council Regulation 1/2003) has entitled the the European Commission to extensively settle cases of alleged anticompetitive conduct. In this paper, we use a formal model of law enforcement to identify the optimal procedure to remedy cases in a context of partial legal uncertainty (Katsoulacos and Ulph in Eur J Law Econ 41(2):255–282, 2016). We discuss in particular the merits of a policy of selective commitments where firms either take strong commitments or are investigated under the standard infringement procedure.