A note on antitrust damages and leniency programs

• Autores: Frederik Silbye
• Localización: European journal of law and economics, ISSN 0929-1261, Vol. 33, Nº 3, 2012, págs. 691-699
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • The European Commission has in recent years initiated an effort to facilitate private actions for damages in cartel cases. This paper demonstrates in a stylized game-theoretic framework that an increase in antitrust damages can be pro-collusive when a leniency program is already in place. The result holds true even if antitrust authorities are allowed to re-shape their leniency program in reaction to the higher damage level. Larger damage payments imply lower incentives to self-report if damages are not fully encompassed by the leniency program; in effect, the program has to be more generous to enforce self-reporting. But if antitrust authorities are not allowed to offer cash rewards to whistle-blowers, the sufficient level of generosity might be unattainable.