Information, Market Incentives, and Student Performance: Evidence from a Regression Discontinuity Design in Brazil

• Autores: Braz Camargo, Rafael Camelo, Sergio Firpo, Vladimir Ponczek
• Localización: Journal of human resources, ISSN 0022-166X, Vol. 53, Nº 2, 2018, págs. 414-444
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • ABSTRACT:We use a discontinuity on the test score disclosure rule for the National Secondary Education Examination in Brazil to test whether test score disclosure affects student performance in public and private schools. We find that the impact of test score disclosure on student performance differs between public and private schools. Our results suggest that this difference is driven by differences in the market incentives faced by these two types of school.