The empirical element in Descartes' physics and its reception by Spinoza

• Autores: Epaminondas Vampoulis
• Localización: The Circulation of Science and Technology: Proceedings of the 4th International Conference of the European Society for the History of Science. Barcelona, 18-20 November 2010 / coord. por Antoni M. Roca Rosell, 2012, ISBN 978-84-9965-108-8, págs. 378-383
• Idioma: inglés
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • Cartesian physics adopts an epistemologically realistic worldview based on the doctrine of the truthfulness of clear and distinct ideas. But the application of this doctrine on physics is closely related to the demonstration of the existence of material objects and thus implies an allusion to experience. Thus, Descartes’ theory concerning the principle of material objects, although claiming to be a mathematical theory, seems to allow experience to play a crucial role. In his first published book, Spinoza gives a “more geometrical” transcription of Descartes’ metaphysics and physics. Spinoza follows a rigid deductive method leading in a deterministic way from the first principle to their consequences and his exposition of Cartesian physics relies strongly on a purely intellectual grasp of the nature of corporeal substance that our senses cannot reveal. But things become more complicated once we realize that Spinoza’s text contains some elements that are not of a purely rational origin