Hegel’s Metaphysics as the Exposition of the Thing-in-itself

• Autores: Lorenzo Cammi
• Localización: Verifiche: rivista trimestrale di scienze umane, ISSN 0391-4186, Vol. 46, Nº. 1, 2017, págs. 129-158
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • The vocation of Hegel’s philosophy is fundamentally metaphysical. So, the issue is what kind of metaphysics is attributable to Hegel. To answer this question, a confrontation with Kant is indispensable. In this regard, Hegel’s foundation of metaphysics starts by realizing not only that Kant’s critique of metaphysics is not conclusive, but also that metaphysical presuppositions are not alien from Kant’s philosophy itself. More precisely, Kant is seen by Hegel as inheriting the subject-object dichotomy from modern metaphysics, which eventually leads him to posit the existence of the thing-in-itself. Since this move has as its consequence the impossibility of guaranteeing the objectivity of knowledge, metaphysics has to tackle such enigma.