Electoral Rules and Political Selection: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan

• Autores: Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia, Georgy Egorov, Ruben Enikolopov
• Localización: Review of economic studies, ISSN 0034-6527, Vol. 83, Nº 3, 2016, págs. 932-968
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own. This article explores how electoral rules, such as district magnitude, mediate this trade-off and affect the composition of representative bodies and the quality of policy outcomes. We show formally that anticipation of bargaining over policy causes voters in elections with multiple single-member districts to prefer candidates with polarized policy positions over more competent candidates. Results from a unique field experiment in Afghanistan are consistent with these predictions. Specifically, representatives selected by elections with a single multi-member district are better educated and exhibit less extreme policy preferences.