Rechtliche Rahmenbedingungen kartellrechtlicher Massenklagen

• Autores: Fabian Stancke
• Localización: WUW : Wirtschaft und wettbewerb = Concurrence et marché = Competition and trade regulation, ISSN 0043-6151, Vol. 68, Nº. 2, 2018, págs. 59-65
• Idioma: alemán
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• Resumen

  • Mit der Kartellschadensersatzrichtlinie und deren Umsetzung durch die 9. GWB-Novelle wollte der Gesetzgeber sicherstellen, dass „jedermann“, der durch Kartellaktivitäten einen Schaden erleidet, hierfür hinreichend effektiv Ersatz erlangen kann. Das Bemühen um effektive Kompensation erlittener Schäden führt mittlerweile zu einer bedeutenden Änderung des Charakters von Schadensersatzklagen in Deutschland. So sammeln Klageinitiatoren bei praktisch jedem von den Kartellbehörden abgeschlossenen Kartellverfahren potenziell Geschädigte mit dem Ziel einer gemeinsamen Anspruchserhebung. Der folgende Beitrag gibt einen Überblick über die rechtstechnischen und rechtspolitischen Rahmenbedingungen kartellrechtlicher Massenklagen und hinterfragt, ob die gegenwärtigen Entwicklungen mit den Grundsätzen des deutschen und europäischen Kartellsanktions- und Schadensersatzrechts vereinbar sind.Cartel damages mass litigation under the German legal systemWith newly implemented rules on civil enforcement of EU and German antitrust laws, the German legislator wanted to ensure that „anyone“ who suffers a damage from cartel activities can obtain a sufficiently effective compensation. This effort, which in principle is consistent with European and German damages law, is now calling for a considerable degree of mass litigation against cartelists. Since Germany has no instrument similar to the Class Action, claimants are exploring functional equivalents which may conflict with the ruling principle of mere compensation of factual damages. Such efforts were furthered by recent developments that allow, under certain prerequisites, for assignment models of special purpose vehicles that acquire claims, and the bundling of individual suits. Besides, new disclosure rules, the possibility of forum shopping and, not at least, legal presumptions that all customers in the market incurred damages, including customers of non-cartel-members and the presumption that a damage has occurred, support plaintiffs that bundle their lawsuits. This situation, which is factually closely modeled on the US-system, does not necessarily lead to a compensation for economic damages suffered. Thus, considering the fact that courts have already lowered the burden of proof, it seems preferable not to generalize facts of damages, as long as there is no respective evidence in each case. It seems reasonable to assess the damages for each claim individually even though this may limit the efficiency of legal proceedings. Otherwise, it would be more consistent to introduce a system based on the US-model for class actions and harmonize this system with administrative fines law. Ultimately, this would mean to cut back the current instrument of administrative fines.