La filosofía personalista considera al hombre como alguien irrepetible, pero resulta complejo establecer en qué consiste esa irrepetibilidad. John Crosby considera que está asociada con la “yoidad” (selfhood) cuyas características serían la incomunicabilidad y la subjetividad. Aceptando básicamente el análisis de Crosby, el autor considera que el término incomunicabilidad es confuso, debe ser abandonado, y propone al yo, definido como autopertenencia autoconsciente, como un modo de caracterizar lo personal de la persona. Finalmente sugiere que no se debe buscar un sustrato ontológico que soporte al yo (sustancia, suppositum) porque esto significaría que lo personal se funda en lo no-personal. El mismo yo es el que debe tener profundidad ontológica.
Personalistic philosophy regards man as a “who” unrepeatable, but it is difficult to establish what that unrepeatability is. John Crosby considers that it is associated with the selfhood whose characteristics would be incommunicability and subjectivity. The author agrees with the analysis of Crosby, but considers that the term incommunicability is misleading and so, it should be given up. And proposes the self, defined as self-conscious self-belonging, as a way of characterizing what is personal in the person. Finally, he suggests that one should not seek an ontological substrate that supports the self (substance, suppositum) because this would mean that the personal is based on the non-personal. The same self is the one who must have ontological depth.
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