A Problem for Moral Naturalism: Outsourcing Moral Judgments
- Autores: Rafael Vogelmann
- Localización: Manuscrito: revista internacional de filosofía, ISSN 0100-6045, Vol. 40, Nº. 3, 2017, págs. 1-27
- Idioma: inglés
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Resumen
ABSTRACT Moral Naturalism is the view that moral judgments aim at describing moral facts and that these are ordinary garden-variety natural facts. Moral Naturalism has trouble accounting for the intuition that we cannot outsource moral judgments, i.e., we cannot ground a moral conviction that p on the fact that a reliable moral adviser holds that p. There have been, however, several attempts to explain this intuition away or to discredit the intuition pumps that bring it forward. I argue that moral naturalists are not in a position to deny this intuition. Moral Naturalism embodies a conception of the minimal conditions for someone to qualify as capable of making moral judgments; among these conditions is the acknowledgment of the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral; given the naturalist's conception of what it takes for someone to be capable of moral judgment, if we allow agents to outsource their moral judgments we come to situations in which the convictions of moral agents do not comply with the acknowledgment of moral supervenience. The naturalist must, therefore, deny the possibility of moral outsourcing. Moral Naturalism, then, faces the problem of making sense of the ban on moral outsourcing.
