Incorrect emotions in ancient, austrian & contemporary philosophy
- Autores: Kevin Mulligan
- Localización: Revue philosophique de la France et de l'etranger, ISSN 0035-3833, Nº. 4, 2017 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Franz Brentano), págs. 491-512
- Idioma: inglés
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Resumen
After a presentation of the Ancient conceptions of órexis, a few questions regarding the nature of “non-intellectual correctness” are raised, whilst the answers offered by Brentano and his heirs are assessed, as well as those proposed within contemporary philosophy of values and contemporary philosophy of mind. It is proposed that the Brentanian conception of values be understood in terms of orthonomy: x is valuable if a positive emotion or desire for x is correct (and one can have knowledge of that emotion or desire). Yet, some texts by Brentano also describe correctness in relational terms (a relation between a mental act and a deontic form), thereby pointing towards contemporary buck-passing and fitting-attitude theories. Brentano thus often leans towards a non-relational conception of correctness, but also sometimes endorses a relational account.
