The establishment of delegated acts should have brought forward significant innovations. In principle, under art.290 TFEU, the Commission now has the monopoly of delegated powers, which ought to be distinguished from implementing powers; the co-legislators should control the delegation on an equal basis, and the comitology procedures should be formally demised. The article seeks to demonstrate that, in practice, these major reforms have been eluded. Instead, a shift in the horizontal and vertical balance of delegated powers has occurred, in favour of the Council and of the Member States respectively. This has, in turn, limited the possible constitutional added value of the Treaty reform, in particular in relation to the principle of separation of powers. In conclusion, the article argues that, in view of the politicization of the Commission, it will be for the Parliament and the ECJ to reverse the current trend and fully realise the untapped potential of art.290 TFEU.
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