El desembarco en Orán en 1732. Aproximacion analitica a una operacion compleja

• Fé Cantó, Luis Fernando ^[1]
  1. [1] EHIC-Université de Limoges
• Localización: Revista Universitaria de Historia Militar, ISSN-e 2254-6111, Vol. 5, Nº. 10, 2016 (Ejemplar dedicado a: La logística anfibia: el poder naval del Imperio español en el Mediterráneo durante el siglo XVIII), págs. 89-110
• Idioma: español
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Dialnet Métricas: 10 Citas
• Resumen
  • español

    En este artículo se interpreta la reconquista de Orán en 1732 por el ejército del rey de España Felipe V teniendo en cuenta el contexto internacional y económico de la época. Se cuestionan así las conclusiones más difundidas sobre esta operación. Una de ellas es la que alude a una maniobra militar organizada para revalorizar la imagen del rey de la nueva dinastía borbónica mediante la reactivación del ideal de cruzada. Se trataría pues de un resurgimiento del arcaismo religioso con fines político-dinásticos. Aquí se defiende una visión que tiene en cuenta el equilibrio de intereses europeos en el Mediterráneo occidental, y también se sostiene que fue una de las operaciones militares más importantes del siglo XVIII hispano. Para ello, fue necesario demostrar una gran capacidad organizativa y logística que, en poco tiempo, movilizó a más de 30.000 hombres y 500 barcos. Frente a una visión arcaizante del acontecimiento militar, se apoya una interpretación más moderna de la política de España en el Magreb. 

  • English

    The present paper is based on original documentation: The letters exchanged between José Patiño, secretario de Guerra of the Spanish Monarchy, and the organizers of the important military expedition that was getting ready, in the spring of 1732, to recover the Algerian city of Oran, under the Ottoman Algerians control since 1708. This documentation is preserved at the General Archive of Simancas, in the Secretaría de Guerra Universal section. Other documents, from the Spanish National Library and other archival holdings, have also been used.The main objective of this work is to contextualize this military operation.  Both the Spanish and the International historiography have just barely approached this episode. This is most probably due to the limited interest that the Maghribi space raises upon the historical research of the Spanish Empire. This space is very often considered as a peripheral territory in which the power was disputed in the first decades of the sixteenth century, when the Spanish presidiums in Northern Africa were conquered just to fall short after into a status quo of more than two centuries. This historical interpretation of the Spanish presidiums fails to explain the above mentioned reconquering expedition of Oran.The intended interpretation on this paper takes account of the Mediterranean history of the eighteen century. The main hypothesis aims to show that this expedition had political and economic motives which are essential to really understand what was at stake in the Western Mediterranean of those years. The amphibious expedition, which mobilized almost 30,000 soldiers, was not only a catholic prestige operation planned by Philip V in order to settle the new dynasty. It was also a military move aiming to weaken the commercial position of both Great Britain and France in Northern Africa. It also anticipated the Spanish intervention in Italy from 1733 onwards. Indeed, many of those who participated in the reconquering of Oran were also later in Italy under the Duke of Montemar’s command.The success of the Spanish army announced a balance rupture inside of the space of conflict between empires which was the Mediterranean. This paper will try to demonstrate the complexity of these conflicts between empires. It also emphasizes on the Spanish military ability to prepare one of the most difficult military operations existing; that of disembarking a large army into hostile territory.