Money laundering laws as a political instrument: the social cost of arbitrary money laundering enforcement

• Autores: Peter Lewisch
• Localización: European journal of law and economics, ISSN 0929-1261, Vol. 26, Nº 3, 2008, págs. 405-417
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • The paper explains the reasons for modern money laundring legislation, namely to reduce the incidence of certain primary offences. Whereas enactment and effectuation of this legislation is costly, its postive effects typically materialize in other jurisdictions (positive external effects). The paper shows that international covenants seek to give direct incentives to overcome the possible underprovision in anti-money laundering legislation and enforcement. The paper also shows how, in such an international context, anti-money laundering legislation can be easily misused as a political weapon in the cross-border fight against "unwanted individuals" and gives concrete examples for such an arbitrary enforcement.