Fragmentation of licensing right, bargaining and the tragedy of the anti-commons

• Autores: Qianwei Ying, Guangnan Zhang
• Localización: European journal of law and economics, ISSN 0929-1261, Vol. 26, Nº 1, 2008, págs. 61-73
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This paper investigates how the fragmentation of licensing right and bargaining affect the occurrence of the “tragedy of anti-commons” in the procedure of enterprise licensing. As found in this paper, if no bargaining is allowed, then greater fragmentation of licensing right can cause greater tragedy of the anti-commons. However, the bargaining between the bureaucracies and enterprise can greatly ease or even eliminate the tragedy of the anti-common under public information, but the relative bargaining power and the extent of fragmentation will affect the distribution of total surplus between the enterprise and the bureaucracies. Yet in the case of private information, bargaining itself may not work efficiently, and interestingly, lower fragmentation of licensing right might enhance the efficiency loss of bargaining, instead of easing the tragedy of the anti-commons.