The economic effects of judicial accountability: cross-country evidence

• Autores: Stefan Voigt
• Localización: European journal of law and economics, ISSN 0929-1261, Vol. 25, Nº 2, 2008, págs. 95-123
• Idioma: inglés
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• Dialnet Métricas: 1 Cita
• Resumen

  • Judicial independence is not only a necessary condition for the impartiality of judges, it can also endanger it: judges that are independent could have incentives to remain uninformed, become lazy or even corrupt. It is therefore often argued that judicial independence and judicial accountability are competing ends. In this paper, it is hypothesized that they can be complementary means towards achieving impartiality and, in turn, the rule of law. It is further argued that judicial accountability can increase per capita income through various channels one of which is the reduction of corruption. First tests concerning the economic effects of JA are carried out and on the basis of 75 countries, these proxies are highly significant for explaining differences in per capita income drawing both on OLS as well as TSLS.