Resumen de Les atteintes au principe d'égalité dans le cadre du calcul des amendes en droit européen des ententes
- English
The principle of equality is mistreated in the context of calculating the fines to be imposed on companies participating in collusion. This article defends the idea that a number of these violations are debatable because they are decided despite not being necessary in view of the aims of the sanction policy. In this matter, the main discriminations result from the method for calculating the fine and the conditions under which the upper limit of the fine is determined. Regarding the method of calculating fines, the guidelines of the EU Commission on this subject state that in determining the basic amount of the fine to be imposed, the Commission will take into account the value of the company’s sales of goods or services to which the infringement directly or indirectly relates in the relevant geographic area. Reference to the value of sales related to the infringement prevents turnover from being considered in its entirety. However, the value of sales itself remains part of the turnover. The value of sales is indeed the company’s turnover in relation to the goods or services in connection with the infringement. Yet turnover is far from being the best criterion in terms of equality. Indeed, by its vagueness, it can lead to treat companies equally which are in different economic and financial situations. Therefore, to improve respect of the principle of equality, this article considers how the guidelines on the method of calculating fines should give a greater role to the value of profits earned by the infringing companies. The method of calculating fines also impairs the principle of equality through the role assigned to the duration of the infringement. Indeed, the basic amount of the fine is based on a percentage of the value of sales related to the infringement multiplied by the number of years of participation in the infringement. According the guidelines on the method of calculating fines, the duration of participation in the infringement is calculated as either a half-year or a full year, which does not permit to take into account situations where there are less than six months of difference in the duration of the companies’ participation in the infringement. Regarding the upper limit of the fine, the final amount of the fine cannot exceed 10 % of the total turnover in the preceding business year of the undertaking participating in the infringement, as laid down in Article 23(2) of Regulation No. 1/2003. However, the existence of an identical ceiling applicable to all companies penalized for antitrust activities is a source of inequality because it leads to treating companies that may be in different situations in the same way. Thus, the ceiling of 10 % reduces the role of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, instruments of individualization of punishment. Indeed, such a system inevitably involves adjustment operations because, by definition, a ceiling represents an absolute limit which applies automatically in the event of a specified threshold being reached, regardless of any other criterion. Similarly, the existence of an identical ceiling does not permit taking into account all of the differences in terms of company size. The ceiling of 10 % is established without distinction of firm size. However, applying the same fine percentage to an SME as for a large company once again undermines the principle of equality. Indeed, by nature, SMEs have more limited economic and financial means to face fines than large companies; as a result, the fines, although calculated using the same percentage of turnover, in fact weigh more heavily on SMEs than on large corporations. This article therefore considers that the method of calculating fines should give a greater role to considerations related to differences in size.
- français
En droit européen de la concurrence, le principe d’égalité est malmené dans le cadre du calcul des amendes devant être infligées aux entreprises ayant participé à une entente. En la matière, les principales discriminations résultent de la méthode de calcul de l’amende et des conditions dans lesquelles intervient le plafonnement du montant de l’amende. Le calcul du montant de base de l’amende, qui se fonde sur la valeur des ventes en relation avec l’infraction et la durée de participation à l’infraction, soulève une difficulté au regard du principe d’égalité parce qu’il ne permet pas une prise en compte suffisante des différences entre entreprises en termes de bénéfices générés et de durée de la participation à l’infraction. L’ajustement du montant de base de l’amende entraîne aussi certaines atteintes au principe d’égalité dans le cadre de l’appréciation des circonstances aggravantes et atténuantes. Pour sa part, le plafonnement du montant de l’amende altère le principe d’égalité parce qu’il peut conduire à limiter le rôle des circonstances permettant d’individualiser la sanction et qu’il ne permet pas une prise en compte suffisante de la différence de taille entre les entreprises sanctionnées. La thèse défendue dans cet article est que ces atteintes au principe d’égalité sont critiquables au regard des finalités de la politique de sanction des ententes.
