Is Hume Attempting to Introduce a New, Pragmatic Conception of a Contradiction in his Treatise?

• Autores: Alan Kenneth Schwerin
• Localización: Principia: an international journal of epistemology, ISSN-e 1808-1711, Vol. 20, Nº. 3, 2016, págs. 315-323
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n3p315Hume’s Treatise, with its celebrated bundle theory of the self, is a significant contribution to the embryonic Newtonian experimental philosophy of the enlightenment. But the theory is inadequate as it stands, as the appendix to the Treatise makes clear. For this account of the self, apparently, rests on contradictory principles — propositions, fortunately, that can be reconciled, according to Hume. My paper is a critical exploration of Hume’s argument for this intriguing suggestion.