We examine the impact of elected local government on national politics, a subject that has been largely neglected in the decentralization literature. We theorize that the creation of locally elected government has the potential to alter contestation at the national level. It can do so, we argue, in four ways: (i) by incentivizing more democratic structures within existing national parties, (ii) by leading to the creation of new parties with more local power bases, (iii) by helping shift political discourse toward “bread and butter” governance issues, and (iv) by encouraging cooperation among parties that must now share power. A preliminary, fieldwork-based test of the theory in Mozambique provides support for the first three of our arguments. If these effects appear in other cases, they have the potential to transform our understanding of how decentralization influences political outcomes, showing that its potential impact extends far beyond the local level.
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