Resumen de China, industry, the WTO and the impact of anti-dumping duties
China's response to the anti-dumping cases brought by the WTO and EU has evolved over the years. From the time of China's accession in 2001 to early 2006, Beijing adopted a cautious approach towards WTO litigation. At this stage, the objective of policy makers was not to win specific disputes but rather to learn the WTO rules. In an effort to discourage WTO litigation, China tended to settle disputes quickly with the complainant once a case was filed or threatened, irrespective of the potential to defend its actions.
Within the EU, the broader trend is for member states to seek to improve trade and investment ties bilaterally with China, and address their concerns about the dumping of Chinese products through Brussels. This has emboldened the EC to confront Beijing on its commercial practices. The EC has exclusive competence on trade matters, and can go ahead regardless of member states' protests. As member states cannot block EC decisions, in the event of a disagreement, as occurred over the issue of tariffs on solar panels, Germany clearly and openly voiced its disagreement with the EC's plans to impose duties. By voicing its concerns, Berlin's objective was to stay on good terms with China and avoid potential retaliatory measures in the event the case passed.
The EU imposed anti-dumping duties ranging from 14.1% to 56.2% in September 2005 on certain finished polyester filament fabrics from China, following a nine-month investigation into the effect of these goods on the European market. The EU investigation discovered that Europe's demand for polyester filament fabrics remained stable for the period of the investigation at approximately 732m running metres. In contrast, China's exports of the product to the EU grew to 288m running metres from 135m running meters in 2000 during the same timeframe.
