Three questions for moderate sceptics

• Autores: Raquel Barradas de Freitas
• Localización: Analisi e diritto = Análisis y derecho = Law and analysis = Droit et analyse = Análise e direito, ISSN 1126-5779, ISSN-e 2785-7220, Nº. 2016, 2016, págs. 305-319
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • This article offers three challenges to moderate scepticism about legal interpretation. First, it is argued that it is possible to reject a rule-centric view of legal interpretation, without necessarily endorsing rule-scepticism. Secondly. it is suggested that a proper understanding of the distinction between what judges do as legal interpreters and what they do as legal officials, would help theorists to develop a better account of legal interpretation. Thirdly, it is submitted that, when understood as something said (and not as an act of scaring), a statement can be true or false. This last point challenges Guastini's claim that interpretative statements do not have truth value.