The constitutional view

• Autores: Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira
• Localización: Principia: an international journal of epistemology, ISSN-e 1808-1711, Vol. 20, Nº. 2, 2016, págs. 165-177
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen

  • http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n2p165 This brief paper is devoted to criticizing the widespread reading of Kant’s first Critique, according to which reference to subject-independent objects is “constituted” by higherorder cognitive abilities (concepts). Let us call this the “constitutional view”. In this paper, I argue that the constitutional reading confuses the un-Kantian problem of how we come to represent objects (which I call the intentionality thesis), with the quite different problem of how we cognize (erkennen) (which I call the “cognition thesis”) that we do represent objects, that is, things that exist independently of the subject.