Sorte, Virtude, e Anulabilidade Epistêmica
- Autores: João Rizzio Vicente Fett
- Localización: Principia: an international journal of epistemology, ISSN-e 1808-1711, Vol. 20, Nº. 2, 2016, págs. 179-200
- Idioma: portugués
- Títulos paralelos:
- Sorte, virtude, e anulabilidade epistêmica
- Enlaces
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Resumen
http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2016v20n2p179 Duncan Pritchard has suggested that anti-luck epistemology and virtue epistemology are the best options to solve the Gettier problem. Nonetheless, there are challenging problems for both of them in the literature. Pritchard holds that his anti-luck virtue epistemology puts together the correct intuitions from both anti-luck epistemology and virtue epistemology and avoids their problems. Contra Pritchard, we believe that there is already a satisfactory theory on offer, namely, the defeasibility theory of knowledge. In this essay we intend (i) to examine Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology, and (ii) to defend the defeasibility theory of knowledge as an alternative to Pritchard’s theory. We will provide the reader with reasons for believing that the defeasibility theory is better than Pritchard’s theory because the former is more economic and more ecumenical than the latter, since it goes without non-epistemic notions and remains neutral as for the internalism vs. externalism debate.
