Functional Measurement in the Field of Empirical Bioethics

• Etienne Mullet ^[6] ; Paul C. Sorum ^[3] ; Nathalie Teysseire ^[6] ; Stéphanie Nann ^[7] ; Guadalupe Elizabeth Morales Martinez ^[4] ; Ramadan Ahmed ^[8] ; Shanmukh Kamble ^[5] ; Cecilia Olivari ^[1] ; Maria Teresa Munoz Sastre ^[2]
  1. [1] Universidad Católica del Maule

     Universidad Católica del Maule

     Provincia de Talca, Chile

     
  2. [2] University of Toulouse II - Le Mirail

     University of Toulouse II - Le Mirail

     Arrondissement de Toulouse, Francia

     
  3. [3] Albany Medical Center Hospital

     Albany Medical Center Hospital

     City of Albany, Estados Unidos

     
  4. [4] Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León

     Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León

     México

     
  5. [5] Karnataka University, India
  6. [6] Institute of Advanced Studies (EPHE), France
  7. [7] University of Caen, France
  8. [8] University of Kuwait, Kuwait

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• Localización: Psicológica: Revista de metodología y psicología experimental, ISSN-e 1576-8597, ISSN 0211-2159, Vol. 33, Nº 3, 2012 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Applications of Functional Measurement in Psychology), págs. 665-681
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • We present, in a synthetic way, some of the main findings from five studies that were conducted in the field of empirical bioethics, using the Functional Measurement framework. These studies were about (a) the rationing of rare treatments, (b) adolescents’ abortions, (c) end-oflife decision-making regarding damaged neonates, (d) end-of-life decision making regarding terminally-ill patients, and (e) sexuality among persons with learning disabilities. The paper also discusses what these findings tell us about the relative importance of the four principles of bioethics that are generally considered as fundamental.

    Two of the four principles—autonomy and justice—seem to dominate lay people’s shared beliefs about bioethics issues. The principle of autonomy is clearly central, and the principle of justice is subordinated to the autonomy principle: Each patient, irrespective of his/her characteristics, has the right to have his/her autonomy of decision respected. The two other principles – benevolence and nonmalfeasance – appear as peripheral ones. Once the autonomy principle is respected and the justice principle applies, acting in a benevolent way and not acting in a malevolent way become simple implications.

    When the patient has lost his/her autonomy, however, these two principles (re)gain importance.