Towards a philosophical understanding of the logics of formal inconsistency

• Autores: Walter Carnielli, Abílio Rodrigues
• Localización: Manuscrito: revista internacional de filosofía, ISSN 0100-6045, Vol. 38, Nº. 2, 2015, págs. 155-184
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • Abstract In this paper we present a philosophical motivation for the logics of formal inconsistency , a family of paraconsistent logics whose distinctive feature is that of having resources for expressing the notion of consistency within the object language in such a way that consistency may be logically independent of non-contradiction. We defend the view according to which logics of formal inconsistency may be interpreted as theories of logical consequence of an epistemological character. We also argue that in order to philosophically justify paraconsistency there is no need to endorse dialetheism, the thesis that there are true contradictions. Furthermore, we show that mbC , a logic of formal inconsistency based on classical logic, may be enhanced in order to express the basic ideas of an intuitive interpretation of contradictions as conflicting evidence.