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Passions and evil in Kant's Philosophy

  • Autores: Maria Borges
  • Localización: Manuscrito: revista internacional de filosofía, ISSN 0100-6045, Vol. 37, Nº. 2, 2014, págs. 333-355
  • Idioma: inglés
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  • Resumen
    • In this paper, I aim at relating passions to evil in Kant's philosophy. I begin by explaining the difference between affects and passions in the textAnthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Kant claims that both affects and passions are illnesses of the mind, because both affect and passion hinder the sovereignty of reason. I show that passions are worse than affects for the purpose of pure reason. Second, I relate affects and passions to the degrees of the propensity to evil in theReligion. I analyze the idea of an ethical community as a way to overcome the evil, which goes beyond political and anthropological solutions suggested by Kant.

Los metadatos del artículo han sido obtenidos de SciELO Brasil

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