Singular Reference Without Singular Thought

• Autores: Filipe Martone
• Localización: Manuscrito: revista internacional de filosofía, ISSN 0100-6045, Vol. 39, Nº. 1, 2016, págs. 29-36
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • In this paper I challenge the widespread assumption that the conditions for singular reference are more or less the same as the conditions for singular thought. I claim that we refer singularly to things without thinking singularly about them more often than it is usually believed. I first argue that we should take the idea that singular thought is non-descriptive thought very seriously. If we do that, it seems that we cannot be so liberal about what counts as acquaintance; only perception (and memory) will do. I also briefly discuss and reject semantic instrumentalism. Finally, I argue that while singular reference is cheap, singular thought comes only at a price.