The evolution of walrasian behavior

• Fernando Vega-Redondo ^[1]
  1. [1] Universitat d'Alacant

     Universitat d'Alacant

     Alicante, España

     
• Localización: Working papers = Documentos de trabajo: Serie AD, Nº. 5, 1996, págs. 1-19
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
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• Resumen

  • Consider an evolutionary context where a given number of quantity-setting oligopolists tend to mimic successful behavior, occasionally experimenting with some small probability. In this context, it is shown that the unique long-run outcome of the process has all firms playing Walrasian, i.e., choosing an output that maximizes profits when taking the market-clearing price as given.