Individual rights and collective responsibility: The rights-egalitarian solution

• Carmen Herrero Blanco ^[1] ; Michael Maschler ^[2] ; Antonio Villar Notario ^[1]
  1. [1] Universitat d'Alacant

     Universitat d'Alacant

     Alicante, España

     
  2. [2] Hebrew University of Jerusalem

     Hebrew University of Jerusalem

     Israel

     
• Localización: Working papers = Documentos de trabajo: Serie AD, Nº. 4, 1996, págs. 1-23
• Idioma: inglés
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen

  • The problem of distributing a given amount of a divisible good among a set of agents which may have individual entitlements is considered here. A solution to this problem, called the Rights-Egalitarian Solution, is proposed and characterized. This allocation rule divides equally among the agents the difference between the aggregate entitlements and the amount of the good available. A relevant feature of the analysis developed is that no sign restriction is established on the parameters of the model (that is, the aggregate entitlements may exceed or fall short of the amount of the good, agents' rights may be positive or negative, the allocation may involve a redistribution on agents' holding, etc.)