Atribución intencional en primates no humanos: el giro hacia la explicación

• Danón, Laura ^[1]
  1. [1] Facultad de Psicología y Facultad de Filosofía y Humanidades, Universidad Nacional de Córdova, Argentina
• Localización: Ludus vitalis: revista de filosofía de las ciencias de la vida = journal of philosophy of life sciences = revue de philosophie des sciences de la vie, ISSN 1133-5165, Vol. 23, Nº. 44, 2015, págs. 143-162
• Idioma: español
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• Resumen

  • Intentional attribution in non-human primates: the explanatory turn.Nowadays, empirical studies on intentional attribution in non-human primates focus on the capacity of those animals to predict the behaviors of others. In some recent work, Kristin Andrews has argued that we need to change that methodological approach by turning to investigate, conceptually and empirically, whether non-human primates are capable of explaining the behavior of others. In her view, such methodological shift is justified because the capacity to seek and generate explanations of behavior is a more reliable indicator of the ability to attribute propositional attitudes. Here, I will argue that Andrews’ proposal faces difficulties analogous to those which plague the approaches which put their focus on the predictive capacities of primates. I will also suggest some ways in which her approach can be modified in order to be able to provide robust evidence of intentional attribution in non-human primates.