Las emociones como metaprogramas: lo que la psicología evolucionista nos puede enseñar sobre éstas
- Autores: Andrea F. Melamed
- Localización: Ludus vitalis: revista de filosofía de las ciencias de la vida = journal of philosophy of life sciences = revue de philosophie des sciences de la vie, ISSN 1133-5165, Vol. 24, Nº. 45, 2016, págs. 135-154
- Idioma: español
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Resumen
Emotions as meta-programms: what evolutionary pshychology can teach us about themThe problem of how to characterize emotions is still open. Different approaches have been grouped into two major views: on the one hand, cognitive theory holds that emotions are essentially constituted by some kind of evaluative judgment; on the other, perceptual theory denies that an evaluation of that sort is necessary for an emotion to occur. In this paper I examine the proposal of evolutionary psychology, specially in the face of emotion problems. In particular, I consider the possibility that their original conception of emotions as superordinate programs, could solve the dispute between the perceptual view and those that defend that a cognitive component, usually an appraisal, is required for an emotion to occur.
