Flexibilidad cognitiva e inferencia
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[1] Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
Argentina
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- Localización: Ludus vitalis: revista de filosofía de las ciencias de la vida = journal of philosophy of life sciences = revue de philosophie des sciences de la vie, ISSN 1133-5165, Vol. 22, Nº. 42, 2014, págs. 115-138
- Idioma: español
- Enlaces
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Resumen
Cognitive flexibility and inferenceSome philosophers, such as Davidson and McDowell, claim that rationality involves a contrast between the subjective and the objective, between mind and world. For these authors, such contrast merges into reflective thought, through linguistic competence. Millikan, instead, has argued that rationality can be placed within non linguistic creatures, which exhibit a first contrast between mind and world by means of behavioral flexibility, as a result of cognitive integration and affordances. In this paper, I will identify what I call “cognitive flexibility”—a middle ground between reflective thought and behavioral flexibility. Cognitive flexibility paves the route to another sort of process-rationality, which results from reasoning and inference. Moreover, I argue that certain kinds of primates are rational in this way through instrumental reasoning.
