Por qué la identidad es la solución correcta para el problema mente-cuerpo
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[1] Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México
México
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- Localización: Ludus vitalis: revista de filosofía de las ciencias de la vida = journal of philosophy of life sciences = revue de philosophie des sciences de la vie, ISSN 1133-5165, Vol. 20, Nº. 37, 2012, págs. 97-126
- Idioma: español
- Enlaces
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Resumen
Identity as the right solution to the mind-body problema. In this paper I offer a new defense of the mind-body identity thesis. The two key arguments are: (1) the causal argument, according to which mental states have no causal influence on our behavior, unless they are identified with physical body/brain states, and (2) biperspectivism or dual-access thesis, which states that we have two access modes or two perspectives to the same physical event: from the first-person perspective and from the third-person perspective. Given this dual-access to only one physical event, we use two different ways of referring it by means of scientific theoretical terms and by the use of the so-called phenomenal concepts. I will also make some critical comments on emergentism and of various erroneous formulations of the identity thesis. Finally, I defend identity against some of the traditional objections, namely, indiscernibility of identicals, Kripke’s objection, the conceivability argument, the knowledge argument, and the explanatory gap.
