¿Puede hablarse de una explicación dinamicista en las ciencias cognitivas?

Venturelli, Nicolás ^[1]
1. [1] Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
  
  Universidad Nacional de Córdoba
  
  Argentina
Localización: Ludus vitalis: revista de filosofía de las ciencias de la vida = journal of philosophy of life sciences = revue de philosophie des sciences de la vie, ISSN 1133-5165, Vol. 20, Nº. 37, 2012, págs. 151-174
Idioma: español
Enlaces
- Texto completo (pdf)

Resumen
- Can we talk about a dynamical explanation in the cognitive sciences?The central aspects of dynamical explanation in the cognitive sciences are identified and analyzed within the theoretical and methodological assumptions that define the young dynamical approach in the field. My analysis draws on the dynamic field model for the A-not-B error (Thelen, et al. 2001) in developmental psychology, taken as a case study. I attempt to tackle the recent accusations which maintain that the dynamicists’ style of work falls short of being explanatory and is merely descriptive, on account of the extensive use of the mathematical language proper to dynamical systems. Accordingly, the discontinuist pretensions confronted with the classical cognitivist accounts are here further justified, particularly regarding of the underlying notion of explanation.