Flexibilidad, restricción y reconocimiento de causalidad de la conducta: una interpretación comparativa del concepto de “libertad”

• Montiel-Castro, Augusto ^[1] ; Martínez-Contreras, Jorge ^[2]
  1. [1] Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana-Lerma. México
  2. [2] Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana-Iztapalapa
• Localización: Ludus vitalis: revista de filosofía de las ciencias de la vida = journal of philosophy of life sciences = revue de philosophie des sciences de la vie, ISSN 1133-5165, Vol. 22, Nº. 41, 2014, págs. 289-310
• Idioma: español
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• Resumen

  • Flexibility, restriction and recognition of the causality of conduct: a comparative interpretation of “liberty” as a concept The concept “liberty” has been revised in great depth by multiple authors from several disciplines. Since the XIX century, the modern evolutionary theory opens its study as an evolutionary capacity and a cognitive process. Its components can be identified in other species by understanding its behavioral or cognitive correlates, as it is often attempted for other complex phenomena (“empathy”, “love”, “intelligence”, and so on) that are similarly based on the interaction of a variety of processes at different levels of organization. Based on empirical evidence, this work analyses the degree by which three necessary components (while probably insufficient) of the de faculty referred to as “liberty” can be found in non-human organisms: (i) the degree of behavioral flexibility; (ii) the capacity for voluntary behaviolar restriction, and (iii) the capacity for recognition of responsibility.