To bridge Gödel’s gap

• Autores: Eileen S. Nutting
• Localización: Philosophical Studies, ISSN-e 1573-0883, Vol. 173, Nº. 8, 2016, págs. 2133-2150
• Idioma: alemán
• Texto completo no disponible (Saber más ...)
• Resumen

  • In “Mathematical Truth,” Paul Benacerraf raises an epistemic challenge for mathematical platonists. In this paper, I examine the assumptions that motivate Benacerraf’s original challenge, and use them to construct a new causal challenge for the epistemology of mathematics. This new challenge, which I call ‘Gödel’s Gap’, appeals to intuitive insights into mathematical knowledge. Though it is a causal challenge, it does not rely on any obviously objectionable constraints on knowledge. As a result, it is more compelling than the original challenge. It is also more general; the challenge applies equally to platonistic and non-platonistic accounts of mathematical truth. And it can be generalized beyond the case of mathematical knowledge to pose a challenge for, e.g., moral knowledge.