Resumen de In defence of the four-case argument
Pereboom’s (Living without free will, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001) Four-Case Argument was once considered to be the most powerful of the manipulation arguments against compatibilism. However, because of Demetriou’s (Australas J Philos 88(4):595–617, 2010) response, Pereboom (Free will, agency, and meaning in life, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014) has significantly weakened his argument. Manipulation arguments in general have also been challenged by King (Ethics 124(1): 65–83, 2013). In this paper, I argue that the Four-Case Argument resists both these challenges. One upshot is that Pereboom doesn’t need weaken his argument. Another is that compatibilists still need a response the Four-Case Argument. And another is that we get a much better understanding of the Four-Case Argument, and of manipulation arguments more generally, than is currently available in the literature.
