Response to Frierson’s “Kantian Feeling: Empirical Psychology, Transcendental Critique and Phenomenology”

• Autores: Jeanine M. Grenberg
• Localización: Con-textos Kantianos: International Journal of Philosophy, ISSN-e 2386-7655, Nº. 3, 2016, págs. 372-380
• Idioma: español
• Enlaces
  • Texto completo (pdf)
• Resumen

  • In this paper, I reject Frierson’s interpretation of Kantian reductionist phenomenology. I diagnose his failure to articulate a more robust notion of phenomenology in Kant as traceable to a misguided effort to protect pure reason from the undue influence of sensibility. But in fact Kant himself relies regularly on a phenomenological and felt first personal perspective in his practical philosophy. Once we think more broadly about what Frierson calls “the space of reasons,” we must admit a robust role for attentive reflection upon felt, phenomenological experience at the center of Kantian practical deliberation.