Strategy-proof voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences

• Hans Peters ^[1] ; Souvik Roy ^[2] ; Ton Storcken ^[1]
  1. [1] Maastricht University

     Maastricht University

     Países Bajos

     
  2. [2] University of Caen, Caen, France
• Localización: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, ISSN 1869-4195, Vol. 2, Nº. 4, 2011 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Special Issue in Honor of Salvador Barberà), págs. 485-496
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • We consider voting rules on a multidimensional policy space for a continuum of voters with elliptic preferences. Assuming continuity, γ-strategy-proofness—meaning that coalitions of size smaller or equal to a small number γ cannot manipulate—and unanimity, we show that such rules are decomposable into one-dimensional rules. Requiring, additionally, anonymity leads to an impossibility result. The paper can be seen as an extension of the model of Border and Jordan (1983) to a continuum of voters. Contrary, however, to their finite case where single voters are atoms, in our model with nonatomic voters even a small amount of strategy-proofness leads to an impossibility.