An individual manipulability of positional voting rules

• Fuad Aleskerov ^[1] ; Daniel Karabekyan ^[1] ; M. Remzi Sanver ^[3] ; Vyacheslav Yakuba ^[2]
  1. [1] Higher School of Economics, National Research University

     Higher School of Economics, National Research University

     Rusia

     
  2. [2] V. A. Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences

     V. A. Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences

     Rusia

     
  3. [3] Istanbul Bilgi University

     Istanbul Bilgi University

     Turquía

     

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• Localización: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, ISSN 1869-4195, Vol. 2, Nº. 4, 2011 (Ejemplar dedicado a: Special Issue in Honor of Salvador Barberà), págs. 431-446
• Idioma: inglés
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• Resumen

  • We study a problem of individual manipulation in an impartial culture (IC) framework using computer modeling. We estimate the degree of manipulability of ten positional voting rules in the case of multiple choice for 3 and 4 alternatives.